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SHERMAN ACT SENTENCING: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY, 1971-1979
One of the more controversial features of anti-
trust law concerns criminal sanctions under the
Sherman Act.' The controversy began in 1890
when no less a proponent of antitrust than Senator
James B. Sherman expressed doubts about includ-
ing criminal sanctions in the Act which was later
to take his name.' Since 1890, the desirability of
antitrust criminal sanctions has been argued in the
courts3 and in the literature4 and has been the
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 3 (Supp. 11 1978).
Section 1. Every iontract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every
person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to
be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if
any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or
by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
Section 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a cor-
poration, or, if any other person, one hundred thou-
sand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
Section 3. Every contract, combination in form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce in any Territory of the United
States or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint
of trade or commerce between any such Territory
and another, or between any such Territory or
Territories and any State or States or the District of
Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the
District of Columbia and any State or States or
foreign nations, is declared illegal. Every person
who shall make any such contract or engage in any
such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall
be punished by fine not exceeding one million dol-
lars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one
hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding three years, or both said punishments, in
the discretion of the court.
2 See 21 CONG. REC. 2604 (1890) (remarks of Senator
Sherman).
' Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913). See note
19 infra.
' See generally Baker & Reeves, Paper Label Sentences:
subject of numerous studies.s Although it still oc-
casionally is debated today,6 the controversy over
Sherman Act criminal sanctions is no longer
whether they are appropriate, but how severe such
sanctions should be.7 This comment examines the
latter issue by looking at antitrust sentencing. The
paper utilizes an empirical approach, examining in
detail Sherman Act sentencing for 1971 through
1979 and exploring possible explanations for why
antitrust sentencing became stricter during the
1970s.
LENIENT SENTENCING IN SHERMAN ACT CASES: A
CRITIQUE
Before the 1970s, Sherman Act violators rarely
received severe sentences.8 Although fine sentences
against offenders have been lenient historically,
9
more indicative of lenience in Sherman Act sen-
tencing prior to the 1970s is the infrequency with
which antitrust offenders have been sentenced to
jail.' O Between 1890 when the Sherman Act was
passed and 1969, there were only 536 criminal
cases in which individual offenders were subject to
Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 619 (1977); Mercurio, Antitrust
Crimes: Timefor Legislative Definition, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW.
437 (1976); Renfrew, The Paper Label Sentences: An Evalu-
ation, 86 YALE L.J. 590 (1977). See also Cahill, Must We
Brand American Business by Indictment as Criminals?, I ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION 26 (1952); Kennedy, The Antitrust
Aims of the Justice Department, 9 N.Y.L.F. 1, 3 (1963).
5 See Flynn, Criminal Sanctions under State and Federal
Antitrust Laws, 45 TEx. L. REV. 1301, 1301 n.3 (1967).
6 See generally Mercurio, supra note 4.
In 1973, for example, when the Senate Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly was considering whether to
increase maximum penalties for Sherman Act violations,
most witnesses testifying on the proposed penalty changes
did not question the desirability of antitrust criminal
penalties but directed their attention to whether the
proposed increases were sufficient to deter would-be an-
titrust violators. See generally The Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, Hearings on S. 782 and S. 1088 Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Sherman Act Felony Hearings]. See also Hearings on H.R.
9203 and H.R. 9947 Before the House Subcomm. on Monopolies
and Commercial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973).
8 Flynn, supra note 5, at 1307.
9 Flynn, supra note 5, at 1305; Posner, A Statistical Study
of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 365, 389 (1970).
See also Senate Sherman Act Felony Hearings, supra note 7, at
173 (testimony of Mark Green).
10 Posner, supra note 9, at 391.
SHERMAN ACT SENTENCING
incarceration." In only twenty-six of these cases
were jail sentences actually served by offenders.'
2
Significantly, of the twenty-six cases in which an-
titrust offenders served time, twenty-two cases in-
volved trade restraints which were vitiated with
racketeering activity or violence or were labor ori-
ented.'3 In other words, in the first seventy-nine
years of Sherman Act enforcement, judges imposed
jail sentences against individuals engaging in
"pure" restraints of trade 4 in only four cases. 15
Although sentences in Sherman Act cases histor-
ically have been lenient, it is difficult to pinpoint
reasons for the leniency. One reason may be the
Sherman Act itself. The Sherman Act, particularly
section one,' 6 broadly describes the conduct it con-
demns. The Act forbids all monopolies and at-
tempts to monopolize as well as all contracts, com-
binations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade,
but nowhere attempts to define or delimit these
concepts.' 7 Not surprisingly, the Act has been con-
demned, both by commentatorss and by courts,' 9
as being too vague to support criminal convictions.
One commentator has described the Sherman Act
as:
vague in the scope of conduct proscribed, vague in
the legal standard used to evaluate a course of
action, and vague in the quantum and quality of
"Id.
12Id. See also Flynn, supra note 5, at 1305-06.
Posner, supra note 9, at 391.
14 The language is Posner's and is meant to indicate
antitrust criminal cases in which the Justice Department
brought only Sherman Act charges. See id. at 389.
15 One of the four "pure" trade restraint cases in which
offenders served time in jail involved the famous Electri-
cal Equipment Conspiracy. U.S. v. Washinghouse Elec-
tric Corp., TRADE REo. REP. (CCH) 45060 (E.D. Pa.
1961). For information on the Electrical Equipment Con-
spiracy, see generally Hearings on the Electrical Industry Before
the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on
the /udiciary, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. (1961).
6 Most criminal antitrust cases are brought under § 1
of the Sherman Act. For example, between 1971 and
1979, the Justice Department filed 166 criminal antitrust
cases (contempt and perjury cases not included). Of the
166 cases, 154 were brought under § 1, seven cases were
brought under both § I and § 2, and only two cases
under § 2. See CCH TRADE REO. REP., U.S. ANrniTusT
CASE SUMMARIES-COMPLAINTS, INDICTMENTs, DEvELOP-
MENTS (10th ed. 1971-79).
171 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITusRT LAw 14
(1978).
is Mercurio, supra note 4, at 438. See also Whiting,
Antitrust and the Corporate Executive, 47 VA. L. REv. 929,
939 (1961).
19 See, e.g., Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373. For
cases in which state antitrust laws have been attacked as
being unconstitutionally vague, see Flynn, supra note 5, at
1312 n.65.
proof necessary to prove a violation. Moreover like
some statutes, and more than most statutes, the
antitrust laws are in constant flux and evolution. As
the national economy, marketing techniques, busi-
ness policy, and a host of other factors that give
impetus and direction of individual business judg-
ments evolve, interpretation and application of the
antitrust laws shift and change to keep pace.20
It is probable that the vagueness of the Sherman
Act has contributed to leniency in antitrust sen-
tencing. In some cases, the sentencingjudge himself
probably believed that the Sherman Act was va-
gue, and adjusted the sentence accordingly. In
other cases, judges were probably persuaded to
reduce sentence by claims of an offending busi-
nessman that the Act did not indicate to the busi-
nessman what was and was not illegal competitive
conduct. Indeed, some evidence does exist which
suggests that businessmen do not know the content
and scope of the Sherman Act.21 The evidence
results from the controversial sentences imposed by
Judge Charles B. Renfrew in United States v. Blan-
kenheim.2 2 In Blankenheim, five corporate executives
in the paper label industry were convicted of price
fixing. Each executive was sentence4 by Judge
Renfrew to make twelve oral presentations to dif-
ferent business and civic groups about his partici-
pation in the price fixing conspiracy. At each pre-
sentation, audience members were given a ques-
tionnaire on antitrust sentencing. One of the ques-
tions inquired about the respondent's knowledge of
the antitrust laws. Although all but one of the
ninety-nine respondents knew that price fixing is
illegal, many respondents had, in the words of
Judge Renfrew, "great difficulty relating the gen-
eral requirements of the antitrust laws to specific
factual contexts."2
The vagueness of the Sherman Act, however, has
been exaggerated. Key Sherman Act concepts,
which were left undefined at the time of the Act's
passage, are no longer meaningless. The task of
20 Flynn, supra note 5, at 1312 (footnotes omitted).
Flynn, however, points out that the vagueness of the
Sherman Act is "myth" because of the policy of the
Justice Department to bring criminal charges in well-
defined per se cases. Id. at 1312-13. See note 29 and
accompanying text infira.
21 Renfrew, supra note 4, at 597-600.
"No. CR-74-182 CBR (N.D. Cal., filed Nov. 1, 1974).
23 Renfrew, supra note 4, at 597. Because of the failure
to employ rigorous statistical techniques, the Renfrew
study is of limited empirical value. Howe Ter, it does
provide, in Judge Renfrew's words, "an impressionistic
canvass of the views of people in various walks of life
about the sentencing of white collar criminals." Id. at
596.
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infusing meaning into the sweeping, imprecise text
of the Sherman Act was left by Congress to the
courts, and the courts diligently have gone about
accomplishing the task. "Restraint of trade," for
example, was defined in 1911 in the landmark
Standard Oil case; 2"conspiracy" was interpreted in
United States v. American Tobacco;a2 and "monopolize
or attempt to monopolize" was explained by Judge
Learned Hand in the famous Alcoa case.
2 6
Moreover, the Sherman Act withstood constitu-
tional attack on vagueness grounds in Nash v. United
States.2 7 In Nash, two corporations and six individ-
uals were charged with monopolization of and
conspiracy to restrain trade in the sale of turpentine
in interstate and foreign commerce. The defend-
ants, among other anticompetitive conduct, ma-
nipulated the market for turpentine and engaged
in coercion of brokers and consumers of turpentine.
At trial, five individuals were found guilty, one
individual was found not guilty, and no judgment
was entered concerning the two corporate defend-
ants. The convicted parties appealed, claiming that
the Sherman Act, as interpreted in Standard Oil28
was unconstitutionally vague. In a brief seven-page
opinion written by Justice Holmes, the Supreme
Court sustained the constitutionality of the Act.
A third reason why the vagueness criticism of
the Sherman Act is exaggerated is the policy of the
Justice Department to bring criminal charges
against only well-defined types of trade restraints.a2
The policy of the Justice Department with respect
to criminal prosecution under the Sherman Act
has been described as follows:
In general, the following types of offenses are pros-
ecuted criminally: (1) price fixing; (2) other viola-
tions of the Sherman Act where there is proof of a
specific intent to restrain trade or monopolize; (3)
a less easily defined category of cases which might
generally be described as involving proof of use of
predatory practices (boycotts, for example) to ac-
complish the objective of the combination or con-
' Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
See text accompanying note 41 infra.
2221 U.S. 106 (1911).
26 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
27 229 U.S. at 376-78. The act was upheld by an eight-
to-one majority.
28 See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
29 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND ITS IMPACT: AN
ASSESSMENT I 10 (1967). See generally Baker, To Indict or Not
to Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion in Sherman Act Enforcement,
63 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1978).
spiracy; (4) the fact that a defendant has previously
been convicted of or adjudged to have been, violat-
ing the antitrust laws may warrant indictment for
a second offense. There are other factors taken into
account in determining whether to seek an indict-
ment in cases that may not fall precisely in any of
these categories. The Division feels free to seek an
indictment in any case where a prospective defend-
ant has knowledge that practices similar to those in
which he is engaging have been held to be in
violation of the Sherman Act in a prior civil suit
against other persons. 3°
Some observers have criticized the enormous dis-
cretion which the language of the Sherman Act
affords the Justice Department in bringing crimi-
nal prosecutions.31 The Justice Department, how-
ever, has faithfully adhered to its express policy.
32
For example, between 1971 and 1979, every section
one case brought by the Justice Department
charged at least one per se violation3 of the Sher-
man Act.34
Ultimately, the vagueness attack against the
Sherman Act is unwarranted, and lenient antitrust
sentencing because of it is unjustified. If anything,
the sweeping text of the Act should be applauded,
rather than disparaged. Although the courts have
infused key Sherman Act concepts with widely-
accepted and well-understood meaning, the
broad language of the Act has imbued it with a
capacity to grow and meet new economic condi-
tions and situations.36 In the words of Chief Justice
Hughes, the Act is written with a "generality and
adaptability comparable to that found to be desir-
able in constitutional provisions." 3 7 The favorable
product of judicial interpretation of the Sherman
' Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to
Study the Antitrust Laws 349, 350 (1955) (statement of
Stanley N. Barnes, Ass't. Att'y. Gen. in Charge of Anti-
trust Division).
Si Mercurio, supra note 4, at 438.
32 Whiting, supra note 18, at 940 n.44.
Per se violations include price fixing, U.S. v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); market and
customer allocation, Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. U.S.,
341 U.S. 593 (1951); U.S. v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405
U.S. 596 (1972); and group boycotts, Klors, Inc. v. Broad-
way-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
' Virtually every § 1 case brought between 1971 and
1979 charged either price fixing or a combination of price
fixing and some other per se violation. See CCH TRADE
Rso. REP., supra note 16.
3 See notes 17-19 supra.
w Flynn, supra note 5, at 1312.




Act, then, is an Act which has proven to be stable
in meaning, but which has also proved to be
workable in practice.
Another possible explanation for lenient sentenc-
ing in Sherman Act cases is the closeness of the
Sherman Act to the common law. Although the
Sherman Act was a product of populist fervor
which spread across the United States in the late
19th century,3 the Act is basically a child of the
common law. Besides its substantive similarity to
the common law trade tort of unfair competition,s
the Sherman Act, according to Senator Sherman,
was not designed to "announce a new principle of
law, but applies old and well-recognized principles
of the common law."
40
In early cases, judges stressed the common law
features of the Sherman Act. The paramount case
interpreting the Sherman Act in terms of the com-
mon law is Standard Oil, in which the Supreme
Court read the Act to condemn only "unreasona-
ble" or "undue" restraints of trade.4' Speaking for
the majority in Standard Oil, Chief Justice White
stated that the concepts contained in the Sherman
Act, "at least in their rudimentary meaning, took
their origin in the common law, and were also
familiar in the law of this country prior to and at
the time of the adoption" of the Act. 2
Another important early opinion on the common
law character of the Sherman Act was delivered by
William Howard Taft, then sitting as judge on the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in United
States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel.43 The Addyston case
contains probably the most exhaustive judicial
treatment of the relationship of the Sherman Act
to the common law. In Addyston, Taft extensively
discussed the common law of trade restraints before
finally concluding that Congress intended the Act
to be interpreted in light of common law princi-
ples."
Because of the common law character of the
Sherman Act, judges, particularly in early cases,
38 For history and background information on the
Sherman Act, see A. WALKER, HIsToRY OF THE SHERMAN
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1910).
' For information on the tort of unfair competition
and other competition related torts, see 3 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 17, at 276-87.
4o 21 CONo. REc. 2456 (1890). See Bock, Legislative Intent
and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 7 (1966).
4' 221 U.S. at 66.
42 Id. at 51.
4385 F. 271 (1898), af/'d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
" Id. at 279-91.
probably saw the Act as a codification of common
law trade tort principles45 and thus more a civil
than criminal piece of legislation. Judges conse-
quently may have been reluctant to impose strong
sentences in Sherman Act criminal cases. They left
enforcement of the Act to injured private parties
willing to sue for treble damages in civil actions,
thereby establishing a precedent of leniency which
would be followed by later judges, even after the
tort and common law flavor of the Act dwindled
and the Act took on the public and regulatory
character which marks it today.
Lenient sentencing based on the position that
the Sherman Act is basically a codified tort action
ignores fundamental Sherman Act policy objec-
tives. Perhaps the most important of these objec-
tives is economic efficiency; by promoting compe-
tition, the Sherman Act improves resource alloca-
tion and adds to the economic well-being of the
consuming public.46 The Act also serves populist
goals. "It disperses wealth; limits business size;
broadens entrepreneurial opportunities; and sub-
stitutes the impersonal forces of the market place
for the economic power of private individuals or
groups to exploit or coerce those with whom they
deal.",4 7 More recently, the Sherman Act has been
touted as an important tool for fighting inflation.
48
Achievement of these Sherman Act policy objec-
tives comes through effective deterrence of would-
be offenders of the Sherman Act.49 The possibility
of civil actions for treble damages may in part serve
as a deterrent. However, private litigants usually
face a number of hurdles which severely limit the
deterrence power of treble damage suits. These
hurdles include the time and labor-consuming pro-
cess of discovery, high attorney's fees, the prospect
of drawn-out litigation, difficulty in proving dam-
ages, and often the enormous size, resources, and
power of the defendant.5° Achievement of Sherman
Act policy objectives thus depends on effectively
severe sentencing in Sherman Act criminal cases.
Judges who view the Sherman Act as civil legisla-
tion and consequently impose lenient sentences
45 See, e.g., Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. at
50.
46 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 17, at 7.
47 
Id.
48 See text accompanying notes 84 & 85 infra.
49 See note 58 and accompanying text infra.
50 For a discussion of the use of treble damage actions
as an enforcement tool, see Comment, Effectiveness of the
Private Treble Damages Action as an Antitrust Enforcement
Mechanism: A Symposium, 8 Sw. U.L. REv. 505 (1976).
1980]
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against offenders, therefore, fail to carry out the
fundamental policies which underlie the Act.
Judges also may have imposed lenient sentences
in Sherman Act cases because they saw sentencing
under the Act in terms of the philosophy of com-
petition law in general. The Sherman Act is part
of a large body of competition law, including the
Clayton Acts ' and the Federal Trade Commission
Act,52 as well as a pantheon of state and federal
regulation of utilities and business.5 3 The basic
philosophy of this body of law, best exemplified by
utility regulation, is to guide or shape the behavior
of business. Within this prospective regulation-ori-
ented milieu, judges probably lost sight of the
purpose of Sherman Act sentencing, which is to
punish past misconduct and hopefully to deter
misconduct in the future.54 Judges consequently
imposed lenient fines in Sherman Act cases to
remind the offending businessman that his past
misconduct was frowned upon and depended upon
carefully drawn consent decrees 5 to ensure proper
conduct in the future.
Judges have probably also imposed lenient sen-
tences against Sherman Act offenders on the basis
that antitrust offenses are not sufficiently morally
serious to warrant harsher sentences.56 Antitrust
5 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12-
27 (1977).
52 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-
48 (1977). Other statutes related to the Sherman Act are
the Wilson Tariff Act, 28 Stat. 570 (1894), as amended,
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 8-11 (1977), and the Webb-Pomerene
Act, 40 Stat. 516 (1918), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 61-65 (1977).
" See, e.g., Justice Department merger guidelines issued
under § 7 of the Clayton Act, [1977] 1 TRADE REC. REP.
(CCH) 4510.
'4See note 58 infra.
0 A useful starting point for information on consent
decrees in antitrust cases is 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note 17, at 140-45. See also Flynn, Consent Decrees in
Antitrust Enforcement: Some Thoughts and Proposals, 53 IA. L.
REV. 983 (1968); Turner, Antitrust Consent Decrees: Some
Basic Policy Questions, 23 REc. A.B.N.Y. 118 (1968); Note,
Flexibility and Finality in Antitrust Consent Decrees, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1303 (1967). For more recent material on anti-
trust consent decrees, see Kalodner, Consent Decree as an
Antitrust Enforcement Device, 23 AmrrRusT BULL. 277
(1978); Zimmer & Sullivan, Consent Decree Settlements by
Administrative Agencies in Antitrust and Employment Discrimi-
nation: Optimizing Public and Private Interests, 1976 DUKE
L.J. 163 (1976); Comment, Construction and Modification of
Antitrust Consent Decrees: New Approaches Afler the Antitrust
Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 296
(1977).
s6For a thorough discussion on the moral aspect of
antitrust crime, see Flynn, supra note 5, at 1315-23.
crime has rarely been seen as being as morally
serious as other crime. In the Renfrew study, for
example, respondents when asked whether anti-
trust violations were more or less stigmatizing or
socially disgraceful than embezzlement, bribery of
a public official, tax evasion, bank robbery, and
consumer fraud, generally replied that antitrust
violations were less stigmatizing.
5 7
The attitude that antitrust violations are not
morally serious derives from the nature of the
conduct the Sherman Act regulates. The Sherman
Act, broadly speaking, regulates pursuit of self-
interest in business. Short of monopoly or attempt
to monopolize, the Act approves pursuit of interest
by individual businessmen and disapproves of it
Lwhen engaged in with competitors. The line the
Sherman Act draws between individual pursuit of
interest and collective pursuit is more a legal line
than a moral one, since there is nothing intrinsi-
cally immoral about pursuit of interest in business.
As such, competitive conduct which falls on the
wrong side of the line may earn a degree of moral
opprobrium because it is in fact a violation of the
law, but the conduct, in the eyes of many sentenc-
ing judges, probably lacks sufficient moral serious-
ness to warrant strict sentencing.
It should be noted, however, that the moral
aspect of Sherman Act offenses is not the basis
upon which judges should impose sentence in Sher-
man Act cases. With crimes such as rape or murder,
which bear a heavy stamp of moral opprobrium,
the judge may appropriately consider the moral
aspect of the crime in setting sentence. With anti-
trust violations, however, the goal of sentencing is
general deterrence; that is, to impose sentences
sufficient to deter future violators.' 8 Judges may
consciously or unconsciously equate severity of sen-
tence with the moral seriousness of the offense,
reserving harsh sentences for offenders engaging in
morally serious crimes. To the extent that judges
have done so in Sherman Act cases, they have
probably been unfaithful to the goal of general
deterrence.
Lenient sentencing based on the minimal moral
seriousness of Sherman Act violations also ignores
the enormous social implications of antitrust crime.
Simply in terms of dollars and cents, the implica-
tions of ineffective sentencing in Sherman Act cases
are enormous. The impact of antitrust crime is not
limited to one locality and a few persons, but is felt
57 Renfrew, supra note 4, at 601 n.19.
s See Baker & Reeves, supra note 4, at 619.
[Vol. 71
SHERMAN ACT SENTENCING
in scores of markets and in the pocket books of
thousands of consumers. 59 Economic efficiency is
also reduced by lenient sentencing because com-
petitors are under no incentive not to monopolize
or to engage in restraints of trade. Besides monetary
and economic costs, there are also sociopolitical
costs to ineffective sentencing. One of the more
important of these sociopolitical costs is loss of
economic freedom of choice. "Antitrust laws in
general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are
the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as
important to the preservation of economic freedom
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights
is to the protection of our fundamental personal
freedoms."
' 6
Another factor contributing to lenient sentenc-
ing in Sherman Act cases is the white collar back-
ground of the offender.6 1 Sherman Act offenders
are typically persons of high standing, both socially
and morally, in the community. Usually, they have
no previous criminal record. The exemplary back-
ground of many Sherman Act offenders has prob-
ably led some judges sitting on Sherman Act cases
to reduce sentence. Character and criminal record
of an offender are normally relevant and, indeed,
important factors for consideration in sentencing.
However, too much can be made of an offender's
character and record in the context of antitrust
sentencing. Because the goal of antitrust sentencing
is general deterrence,62 the primary focus for the
judge when imposing sentence should not be the
offender's character and record, but on the proba-
ble effect sentencing will have on future violators.
Ultimately, chief responsibility for lenient Sher-
man Act sentencing rests in the failure of the
Justice Department to actively seek, and of Con-
gress to actively support, stricter Sherman Act
sentencing. Historically, the Justice Department
has not avoided bringing Sherman Act criminal
actions. Between 1890 and 1969, for example, the
Justice Department filed criminal charges in 44.7%
of Sherman Act cases.63 However, the Justice De-
59 See Flynn, supra note 5, at 1319-20.
60 United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. at 610.
61 See generally E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME
(1949).
62 See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
6 Posner, supra note 9, at 385. The percentage of
criminal to total cases is similar for the 1970s. Between
1971 and 1979, the Justice Department brought 182
criminal cases and 390 cases in total, for a percentage of
46.7%. Material on the number of Sherman Act criminal
and civil cases from 1971 to 1979 is broken down by years
below. Civil actions arising from or jointly filed with
partment has not actively sought in the past to
incarcerate Sherman Act offenders. 64 Indeed, the
Justice Department did not begin to seek incarcer-
ation of Sherman Act offenders until 1977.
65
Congress also exhibited little interest before the
1970s in having strict sentences imposed against
Sherman Act offenders.66 Prior to 1974, Congress
increased the penalty provisions of the Sherman
Act only once. The increase occurred in 1955, when
the ceiling on fines for individuals and corporations
violating the Sherman Act was changed from
$5,000 to $50,000.67 As a result of the insouciance
of Congress and the Justice Department regarding
Sherman Act sentencing, the courts have faced
little institutional pressure to impose severe sen-
tences against Sherman Act violators. Left to their
individual discretion,judges consequently imposed
lenient sentences in Sherman Act cases.
To sum up, judges historically have been reluc-
tant to incarcerate Sherman Act offenders and
have been equally unwilling to impose stiff fines in
Sherman Act cases. Several factors, including the
broad language and common-law origins of the
Act, the philosophy of regulation implicit in com-
petition law in general, the relative morality of
Sherman Act violations, the character and record
of Sherman Act offenders, and the lack of congres-
sional and administrative pressure for strict sen-
tencing, may have contributed to judicial lenience
in sentencing Sherman Act violators. However,
most of these explanations for leniency in Sherman
Act sentencing either lack merit, have been exag-
gerated in importance, or obscure more important
criminal suits have not been counted. See CCH TRADE

























64 Flynn, supra note 5, at 1306.
65 See text accompanying notes 79-83 infra.
66 See note 71 and accompanying text infra.
67 69 Stat. 282. The Sherman Act, as originally passed,
provided for maximum fines of $5,000 and jail terms of
one year. 26 Stat. 209.
19801
TABLE 1
Individuals sub- Individuals serving
ject to sentence Individuals serving
Period (nolo plea, guilty sentence (incarcera- Individuals serving no fene sv federe iggeriotion, fine, or com- sentence fenders serving fenders serving
plea, or convic- mnity orvce) sentence no sentence
tion) muniy service)
Misdemeanor, 204 179 25 87.7 12.3
1971-75
Misdemeanor, 168 167 1 99.4 0.6
1976-79
Felony, 1976-79 59 59 0 100.0 0.0
Misdemeanor & 227 226 1 99.6 0.4
Felony, 1976-
79
Totals, 1971-79 431 405 26 94.0 6.0
sentencing considerations. The historical record of
the courts in sentencing Sherman Act offenders has
therefore not been an impressive one.
SHERMAN ACT SENTENCING, 1971-1979:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
As the following study of Sherman Act sentenc-
ing during the 1970s should indicate, the pattern
of leniency which historically has existed in anti-
trust sentencing ended in the 1970s. Data for the
study, which covers the years from 1971 through
1979, was gathered from the Blue Book68 and
includes only cases involving "pure" restraints of
trade.69 To allow for better understanding of trends
in antitrust sentencing during the 1970s, the data
has been broken down into three general catego-
ries: 1) misdemeanor antitrust cases, 1971-75, 2)
misdemeanor cases, 1976-79, and 3) felony cases.
Table 1 provides information on the frequency
with which Sherman Act offenders were sentenced
during the 1970s. Between 1971 and 1979, 431
individuals were subject to sentence for Sherman
Act violations; 405 of these persons (or 94.0%)
ultimately served some sentence. A close look at
the material reveals that sentencing became stricter
in the latter years of the 1970s. Although the
percentage of individuals serving sentence in mis-
demeanor cases from 1971 through 1975 is a re-
spectable 87.7%, the sentencing performance of
courts in the last four years of the decade was
outstanding. Of 227 persons subject to sentence in
misdemeanor and felony cases from 1976 through
1979, 226 (or 99.6%) served some sentence. Nota-
68 CCH TRADE REG. REP., supra note 16.
69 In other words, the study does not consider cases in
which antitrust charges are coupled with charges of
racketeering, perjury or mail fraud. See note 14 and
accompanying text supra.
TABLE 2
Individuals Individuals Percentage of
Period Subject to Incarcer- Individuals
Sentence ated Incarcerated
Misdemeanor, 204 26 12.7
1971-75
Misdemeanor, 168 35 20.8
1976-79
Felony, 1976-79 59 22 37.3
Misdemeanor & 227 57 25.1
Felony, 1976-
79
Totals, 1971-79 431 83 19.3
bly, all fifty-nine felony defendants subject to sen-
tence incurred some penalty.
In addition to imposing more sentences against
Sherman Act offenders in the 1970s, courts showed
an increasing willingness to incarcerate violators.
In table 2, the number of individuals incarcerated
for violating the Sherman Act is compared with
the number of individuals subject to sentence.
From 1971 through 1975, 12.7% of Sherman Act
offenders were incarcerated, a remarkable statistic
when compared to the frequency with whichjudges
imposed jail sentences against Sherman Act de-
fendants prior to 1971.70 Yet, in antitrust cases
from 1976 through 1979, the rate at which offend-
ers were incarcerated doubled, increasing from
12.7% to 25.1%. In misdemeanor cases for 1976
through 1979, the percentage of offenders spending
time in jail reached 20.8%. In addition, 37.3% of
felony defendants served jail time, a rate of incar-
ceration three times that for offenders in misde-
meanor cases from 1971 through 1975.
The percentage ofjudges imposing jail sentences
against Sherman Act offenders also increased dur-




Cases in which at Cases in which % of cases in % of cases in
least one individual Judge imposed at udge imposed no which Judge im- which Judge im-
Period was subject to sen- least one jail sen- Jujail sentence posed at least one posed no jail sen-
tence tence jail sentence tence
Misdemeanor, 44 9 35 20.5 79.5
1971-75
Misdemeanor, 27 7 20 25.9 74.1
1976-79
Felony, 1976-79 16 7 9 43.7 56.3
Misdemeanor & 43 14 29 32.6 67.4
Felony, 1976-
79
Totals, 1971-79 87 23 64 26.4 73.6
ing the 1970s. Table 3 measures the percentage of
judges incarcerating offenders by tabulating the
number of Sherman Act cases in which at least one
offender served time in jail. From 1971 through
1975, judges imposed at least one jail sentence in
only one of every five Sherman Act criminal cases
(20.5%). In misdemeanor and felony cases from
1976 through 1979, however, at least one offender
was sentenced to jail in one of every three Sherman
Act criminal cases (32.6%). Thus, not only did the
percentage of Sherman Act offenders receiving jail
terms increase as the 1970s progressed, the number
ofjudges imposing jail sentences increased as well.
Although judges sitting on Sherman Act cases
demonstrated an increasing willingness to use the
jail sentence against offenders, they did not behave
predictably in setting the term to be served. Table
4 presents data on the length of sentence imposed
in Sherman Act cases during 1971 through 1979.
As table 4 indicates, the length of sentence imposed
against Sherman Act offenders fluctuated during
the 1970s. In misdemeanor cases from 1971
through 1975, twenty-six individuals served a total
of 1495 days in jail for an average sentence of fifty-
eight days. The average sentence for the twenty-
two felony defendants serving time was a compa-
rable fifty-nine days. However, the thirty-five de-
fendants serving time in misdemeanor cases from
1976 through 1979 spent only 759 days in jail, an
average sentence of twenty-two days. Thus, despite
the fact that judges were increasingly willing to
incarcerate Sherman Act defendants, the material
in table 4 indicates that there still was considerable
disagreement among judges as to the appropriate
jail term individuals should serve for Sherman Act
violations.
Table 5 examines for 1971 through 1979 how
often courts imposed fine sentences against Sher-
man Act violators. As table 5 shows, judges sitting
TABLE 4
Individuals Total AveragePeriod Serving Time Served Sentence
Misdemeanor, 26 1495 58 days
1971-75
Misdemeanor, 35 759 22 days
1976-79
Felony, 1976-79 22 1295 59 days
TABLE 5
Individuals Individ- % of indi-
Period subject to sen- uals viduals
tence fined fined
Misdemeanor, 204 176 86.3
1971-75
Misdemeanor, 168 153 91.1
1976-79
Felony, 1976-79 59 48 81.4
Misdemeanor &
Felony, 1976-79
Totals, 1971-79 431 377 87.5
on antitrust cases were fairly consistent during the
decade in imposing fine sentences. In misdemeanor
cases from 1971 through 1975,86.3% of individuals
subject to sentence received fines. The percentage
of offenders fined reached 91.1% in misdemeanor
cases from 1976 through 1979, and felony defend-
ants were fined 81.4% of the time.
Although courts imposed the fine sentence in a
fairly consistent fashion during the 1970s, they did
not avoid imposing harsher fines. As table 6 indi-
cates, the average fine imposed against Sherman
Act offenders increased substantially during the
1970s. In misdemeanor cases from 1971 through
1976, 176 individuals were assessed fines cumulat-
ing $1,479,500, for an average sentence of $8,400.
19801
TABLE 6
Period Individuals Fined Total S Levied Against Individuals Average FineFined
Misdemeanor, 1971-75 176 $1,479,500 $8,400
Misdemeanor, 1976-79 153 $1,816,200 S11,900
Felony, 1976-79 48 $841,000 $17,500
TABLE 7
Individuals
Fined, Individuals Individuals Individuals Percentage of Percentage of Percentagels of
Period jailed or Jailed Only Fined Only Both Jailed Individuals Individuals Both Jailed
both Fined and Fined Jailed Only Fined Only and Fined
and Jailed
Misdemeanor, 179 3 153 34 1.7 85.5 12.8
1971-75
Misdemeanor, 167 14 132 21 8.4 79.0 12.6
1976-79
Felony, 1976-79 53 5 31 17 9.4 58.5 32.1
Misdemeanor & Fe- 220 19 163 38 8.6 74.1 17.3
lony, 1976-79
Totals, 1971-79 399 22 316 61 5.5 79.2 15.3
TABLE 8
Period Corporate Offenders As- Total S Levied Against Corporate Average Sentencesessed Fines Offenders
Misdemeanor, 1971-75 343 $8,007,100 $23,300
Misdemeanor, 1976-79 175 $5,323,180 $30,400
Misdemeanor, 1971-79 518 $13,330,280 $25,700
Felony, 1976-79 134 $23,351,375 $174,300
Fines against misdemeanor defendants in the pe-
riod from 1976 through 1979 increased 42% to
$11,900. Felony defendants paid, on the average,
a fine of $17,500, or more than twice the average
fine incurred by offenders in misdemeanor cases
from 1971 through 1975.
Besides imposing steadily stiffer fines against
antitrust offenders during the 197 0s, judges tough-
ened sentencing by increasingly imposing fine sen-
tences in conjunction with jail terms. Table 7
examines judicial use of fine only, jail only, and
fine and jail sentences from 1971 through 1979.
The percentage of fine only sentences declined as
the 1970s progressed. In misdemeanor cases from
1971 through 1975, 153 of 179 offenders (85.5%)
received fine only sentences. From 1976 through
1979, however, judges levied fine only sentences
against only 74.1% of felony and misdemeanor
offenders. The percentage of defendants receiving
a jail and fine sentence, on the other hand, in-
creased during the 1970s, from 12.8% in misde-
meanor cases from 1971 through 1975 to 17.3% in
misdemeanor and felony cases for the years of 1976
through 1979. The increase in use of the jail and
fine sentence in the latter years of the 1970s is
attributable, however, to felony cases where 32.1%
of defendants served both a jail and fine sentence.
As table 8 indicates, judges in the 1970s also
toughened fine sentences for corporations violating
the Sherman Act. In misdemeanor cases from 1971
through 1979, for example, 518 corporate offenders
suffered an average penalty of $25,700. In felony
cases, in contrast, the average sentence for corpo-
rate offenders was $174,300.
Although it is difficult to establish with certainty
why Sherman Act sentencing toughened during
the 1970s, it is still possible to point to factors
which reasonably can be said to have had some
influence on judges' sentencing in Sherman Act
cases. Passage of the Antitrust Procedures and
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Penalties Act, for example, was probably the most
important factor contributing to stricter antitrust
sentencing during the 1970s. Congress passed the
Procedures and Penalties Act in 1974.7 ' The Pro-
cedures and Penalties Act, besides making impor-
tant changes in procedures for using consent de-
crees in antitrust cases, 72 increased the ceiling on
fines for corporate offenders from $50,000 to
$1,000,000 and for individuals from $50,000 to
$100,000, and raised the maximum jail term for
individuals from one to three years. In addition to
these penalty increases, the Procedures and Penal-
ties Act elevated the status of Sherman Act viola-
tions from misdemeanor to felony.
Several commentators have criticized elevating
Sherman Act violations to felony status, principally
on the ground that the Sherman Act is too impre-
cise to brand as felons businessmen violating the
Act.73 The criticism, however, is unwarranted, since
the Justice Department in felony cases has carefully
followed its longstanding policy of only seeking
criminal charges against individuals engaging in
well-defined types of trade restraints, such as price
fixing.
74
Elevating Sherman Act offenses to felony status
also has been criticized on deterrence grounds. At
least one commentator has argued that felony sta-
tus would not spur judges sitting on Sherman Act
cases to impose stricter sentences, rather it would,
if anything, provoke judges to sentence less harshly
than in the past.75 The contention appears to be
7' Act of December 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528,.88
Stat. 1708.
Sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Act entitled "An Act to
protect trade and commerce against unlawful re-
straints and monopolies," approved July 2, 1890 (15
U.S.C. § 1, 2, and 3), are each amended-
(1) by striking out "misdemeanor" whenever it
appears and inserting in lieu thereof in each
case "felony";
(2) by striking out "fifty thousand dollars"
whenever such phrase appears and inserting in
lieu thereof in each case the following: "one
million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other
person, one hundred thousand dollars"; and
(3) by striking out "one year" whenever such
phrase appears and inserting in lieu thereof in
each case "three years."
72 See Comment, supra note 55.
73 Halverson, An Evaluation of Substantive Changes and
Penalties, 43 ArmTRusr LJ. 419, 423 (1974); Mercurio,
supra note 4, at 438-39. See generally Official Report From
Washington, Antitrust and the Proposed Revision of Federal
Criminal Laws, 43 ANrrRusr L.J. 395 (1974).
74 From 1976 through 1979, the Justice Department
brought 45 felony cases. In each case, the Department
charged at least price fixing or bid rigging. See CCH,
TRADE REC. REP., supra note 16.
7s Halverson, supra note 73, at 423.
based on how sentencing judges would react to the
collateral consequences an individual suffers when
he is convicted of committing a felony.
76 Judges, it
apparently was feared, would ease sentences
against Sherman Act offenders convicted of felony
violations because such offenders were already sad-
dled with the collateral consequences of a felony
conviction. Although the argument has a degree of
theoretical appeal, it ignores the fact that most
felony defendants in antitrust cases escape the col-
lateral effects of a felony conviction by pleading
nolo contendere.77 In addition, in cases where fe-
lony defendants have been convicted of violating
the antitrust laws and have thus incurred collateral
consequences, judges have generally treated con-
victed defendants as severely as, and sometimes
more severely than, felony defendants pleading
nolo contendere in the same case. 78 Thus, elevating
Sherman Act violations to the status of felony has
not been the barrier to tougher sentencing some
observers thought it would be.
A second factor which has contributed to stricter
Sherman Act sentencing in the 1970s is the policy
of the Justice Department to seek stricter sentences.
The Justice Department has stated its policy con-
cerning incarceration as follows:
The maximum prison term for a Sherman Act
felony is three years and the corresponding parole
eligibility would occur after one year. The Antitrust
Division will, in appropriate circumstances, recom-
mend this maximum penalty. In arriving at individ-
ual recommendations, the step-by-step approach
will be followed considering and applying several
aggravating and mitigating factors to a base sen-
tence of 18 months. The 18 months will be the base
period from which recommendations in all criminal
antitrust cases, except those which involve very
small, purely local conspiracies, will be calculated.
79
The Justice Department has also stated that the
recommended fine will track the recommended
prison sentence.
76 Collateral consequences of a felony conviction in-
clude disenfranchisement and disqualification for public
office. For an extensive treatment of collateral conse-
quences, see Comment, The Collateral Consequences of a
Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REv. 929 (1970).
77 Posner, supra note 9, at 388-90. In felony Sherman
Act cases beginning in 1976 through 1979, 53 defendants
pleaded nolo contendere to charges of violating the Sher-
man Act, while five defendents were convicted of, and
one defendent pleaded guilty to, violating the Act. See
CCH, TRADE REG. REP., supra note 16.
7 See T.ADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 2548, 2576, 2662,
for felony cases in which individuals were convicted or
pleaded guilty to violating the Sherman Act.
79 45 U.S.L.W. 2419 (Mar. 8, 1977).
The midpoint in the permissible sentencing
range, $50,000, would be the base point, just as 18
months is the base prison sentence. $50,000 may be
unduly severe for defendants with a net worth below
a certain figure. Accordingly, where $50,000 exceeds
25 percent of an individual's net worth the latter
figure would be used as the base point. 80
With respect to corporate offenders, the Depart-
ment has announced that it will take as base point
"ten percent of the corporation's total sales in the
affected line of commerce by a corporation during
a conspiracy. Where there is evidence that this
figure is, in fact, low, we shall use the actual
percentage increase and apply this figure."81 In
reaching its sentencing recommendations and de-
parting from the above base points, the Justice
Department considers five factors: 1) the amount
of commerce involved in the restraint, 2) the posi-
tion of the individual involved in the restraint, 3)
the existence and degree of predatory or coercive
conduct, 4) the length of participation in the re-
straint, and 5) any previous convictions. s2 The
Justice Department has also stated that it will
consider whether and to what degree an offender
has cooperated with the Department as well as any
personal, family, or business hardships an offender
may have.
83
The penalty increases adopted by Congress in
1974 and the policy statement expressed by the
Justice Department in 1977 have put institutional
pressure on courts to impose stricter sentences
against Sherman Act offenders and reasonably ex-
plain why courts imposed progressively tougher
sentences in the latter years of the 1970s. However,
the courts began imposing tougher sentences in
Sherman Act cases in 1972, suggesting that insti-
tutional pressure is not the only factor responsible
for tougher sentencing in Sherman Act cases during
the 1970s. Less tangible factors probably have
contributed to stricter sentencing as well.
8 Id.
81 Id. at 2420.
82Id. at 2419.
8 Id.
One such factor is the role strong antitrust sen-
tencing was seen as having in the early 1970s in
promoting prosperity in the economy. It was
thought that effective sentencing would help fight
inflation by deterring antitrust violations.84 Presi-
dent Ford in 1974, for example, requested increased
penalties for Sherman Act offenses as part of a
comprehensive plan for fighting inflation. 85 Al-
though the effectiveness of antitrust prosecution in
decreasing price levels has been criticized,86 it is
likely that judges sitting on Sherman Act cases in
the early 1970s imposed stricter sentencing on the
ground that strong sentencing would aid economic
recovery.
CONCLUSION
Sherman Act sentencing became stronger during
the 1970s. In contrast with the pattern of lenient
sentencing which historically has been the hall-
mark of Sherman Act sentencing, courts began in
1972 to impose stricter sentences against antitrust
violators. During the 1970s, for example, more
individuals served time in jail for Sherman Act
violations than in the years from 1890 to 1969
combined. Besides incarcerating more offenders,
the courts imposed stricter fine sentences against
both corporate and individual offenders. In addi-
tion, as the decade passed, judges sitting on Sher-
man Act criminal cases increased the severity of
sentences, imposing the strongest sentences against
felony offenders. Although the deterrent impact of
tougher sentencing is still not clear, the trend of
stricter sentencing in Sherman Act criminal cases
promises to continue and thus provides for an
encouraging beginning for antitrust enforcement
in the 1980s.
DAVID ECKERT
8 See generally Antitrust in Times of Economic, Technological
and Ecological Crisis: A Symposium, 36 U. Prrr. L. REV. 591
(1975).
85 Address by President Gerald R. Ford, Joint Session
of the 93d Cong. (Oct. 8, 1974), reprinted in 10 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1239 (1974).
86 See generally Handler, Antitrust-Myth and Reality in an
Inflationay Era, 50 N.Y.U.L. REV. 211 (1975).
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